The critical feature of epiphenomenalism, as we have seen, is that our mind states have no reciprocal effect on our bodies. That is, our brain states give rise to mind states-- especially qualia-- that are irreducible to simply physical descriptions. But our reactions to the outside world are fully determined by processes within the brain-- physical processes that obey physical, causal laws. The qualia of the mind, then, have no impact on our behavior.
In some sense, I can almost buy this viewpoint, as unusual as it might be. I can comprehend how the sensation of pain is irrelevant for my bodies flinching away from a dangerous situation. If I put my hand on a hot stove, I can understand how the heat will physically affect my nerve endings, which will send a particular signal to the sensory processor in my brain, which will be appropriately connected to the motion-control center of my brain, which will be programmed (through the slow arduous refinement of past evolution) to react by flinching my hand away from the heat source. At no point in this process does the "Ouch, I'm in pain!" feeling do any work.
However...
There are some experiences for which I believe this kind of story simply cannot be told. The best example, in my opinion, is our experience of music. I cannot fathom how sound waves impinging on my eardrum, in turn sending an electrical signal to a part of the brain, can produce a feeling of pleasure-- even if that "pleasure" feeling is simply a reaction in another part of the brain. I cannot understand how some music would produce pleasure, while other music-- which under the epiphenomenalist's view, is ultimately just a different pattern of electrical signals sent from the eardrum-- would produce revulsion. It just doesn't make sense. I don't know if that is a knockdown argument against epiphenomenalism, but it's enough for me to drop it completely.
In the area of music-- and really, in our experience of any kind of art-- the qualia of our experiences have to be doing the bulk of the work. I just can't see it any other way.
2 comments:
That's a really good point, I've never thought of that. And it's even more strange that the feelings can go father than pleasure and revulsion. For example- Goodnight Saigon. Goodnight Saigon is a song by Billy Joel that chronicle the war in Vietnam. It is extremely depressing and almost made me (dare i say it) cry when i first heard it- yet it still is pleasing to me. How can music and literature produce a catharsis like this without our mind being causally related to our bodies? This extends well beyond music and the arts as well, however. There are feelings such as Love and physical attraction that I cannot see being just side effects. - Jim
Jim, I like that point you make about physical attraction and love, but i disagree with you to a certain extent. I think physical attraction is compatible with epiphenomenalism. It makes sense to me that through evolutionary necessity, the brain would be able to register desirable physical features and generate a feeling of attraction. This would be a reproductive necessity. However, i do agree with you on the point about love. Love is irrelevant when it comes to reproductive success. Love i could not see being generated from the firing of neurons because it is based on feelings beyond raw physical attraction. For example, you can love someone you are not physically attracted to (Did you ever see Shallow Hal?. In my opinion love can only be accounted for by mental processing on a higher level than the firing of neurons. For me, this defeats epiphenomenalism. -- Tom
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