Pages

Friday, September 01, 2006

Discussion Wrap-Up

I wanted to tie up a couple of loose ends from the argument I was making about the Statue of Liberty (especially for the second section, where nobody was buying what I was selling).

Consider three different objects:

1. A green Statue of Liberty. This is a possible object, since it actually exists (the left-most column of my chart).

2. A purple Statue of Liberty. This object doesn't exist, but it might have. So it's merely possible (the middle column of my chart).

3. A purple Statue of Liberty that exists. This object doesn't exist (the only Statue of Liberty in the world is not purple). Before we even get to the question of whether it might have existed, notice that a contradiction has already shown up. The description of the object says that it exists. An examination of the world says it doesn't. I think we can call this a logical contradiction, in the same way a squared circle logically contradicts itself. And in both cases of self-contradictory objects, we say the objects are impossible (the right-most column of my chart).

How does all this apply to the ontological argument? Remember, at the very end I said God either shows up in the "Possible and Existing" category (Rowe mentions this as well), or in the "Impossible" category (where, necessarily, God wouldn't exist).

Recall also the second premise of the argument: "God is a possible being." One of two things is happening. The premise might be true-- in which case God belongs in the "Possible and Existing" column. But if God belongs there, then the second premise is basically stating that God exists. The argument begs the question because the conclusion-- "God exists in reality"-- shows up in one of the premises (albeit not explicitly).

Or the premise might be false. God might be an impossible being, because he doesn't exist even though a list of his traits says he does. But if the premise is false, the argument is unsound, and we haven't deductively proven the conclusion.

In either of these two cases, the argument is flawed. And there are no other possibilities.

But like I said, this is not the only way the argument can be attacked-- Ramsey will give his own objection on Tuesday. Strange, then, that the argument can be attacked in two different ways. If the argument doesn't work, shouldn't there be a single objection that everyone acknowledges is the problem?

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

Thanks for clearing that up it definitely made a lot more sense when i could see it all written down...im totally getting the statue of liberty thing now. I also am really looking forward to hearing what Ramsey has to say about anything and get his take on it all that he said he was going to present next class. especially because you said he usually tries to present both sides and does not always give his own opinion, im excited to hear what he has to say and actually see his point of view on all of this. thanks again!

Anonymous said...

Ok, my last post should read "I am also really looking forward to hearing what Ramsey has to say about everything and get his take on all of this, which i believe he said he would present next class"
sorry, i was deleting stuff and it ended up not making any sense.

Joe said...

Believe me, if you didn't get the argument I presented in class, it was completely my fault. There, I was focusing too much on what it meant for an object to be "possible". It wasn't until after the second class that I realized it was a lot easier to focus on what makes an object impossible.

Take it as a lesson about critiquing a first draft. Most likely, a little extra work will let you improve your own arguments.